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On the Concept of an Organ of State1
Some authors do not analyze the concept of an organ of state at all in 
their works on this issue2, others define it on the basis of the area of 
law they are discussing, some describe it as a separate part of the state 
apparatus or a separate organizational entity3, others refer to the per-
sonal substrate—for them such an organ is a person or group of people 
(a collegium) endowed with competence, sometimes it is said to be gen-
eral competence4, and, finally, sometimes it is defined as the authority 
1 Translated from: Karol M. Pospieszalski, O pojęciu organu państwowego, „Ruch Prawnic-
zy, Socjologiczny i Ekonomiczny” 1972 , no. 1. by Stephen Dersley. The translation 
and proofreading were financed by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education under 
848/2/P-DUN/2018.
2 S. Włodyka, Ustrój organów ochrony prawnej, Warszawa 1968; Z. Resich, Nauka o ustroju 
organów ochrony prawnej, Warszawa 1970. 
3 A. Burda, Polskie prawo państwowe, Warszawa 1969, pp. 199, 200: An organ of state: this 
is a part of the state apparatus that is distinguished from the other parts of this apparatus 
by the fact that, as part of the whole operation, it fulfills specific tasks and is organized in 
a special way. M. Jaroszyński, Polskie prawo administracyjne, Warszawa 1956, p. 162:
in a strict legal sense, an organ of state is a distinct part of the state apparatus (an 
organizational unit) established to perform state-mandated tasks with the help of 
measures that derive from the states’ supreme power (imperium). J. Starościak, 
Prawo administracyjne, Warszawa 1969, p. 51, 52, 54: an administrative organ 
is a separate unit in the state organization, having the scope of its activity estab-
lished by law (which can be credited to the state in the field of organizing social 
relations) and undertaking this action through persons specified in law and in 
specific legal forms […] on the one hand, a separate sphere of competence, but 
on the other hand it is also a set of material and personal resources …
 
4 In this way or similarly, C. Znamierowski, Podstawowe pojęcia teorii prawa. Układ prawny 
i norma prawna, Warszawa 1924; C. Znamierowski, Prolegomena do nauki o państwie, 
Warszawa 1948, p. 253; C. Znamierowski, Wiadomości elementarne o państwie, Warszawa 
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or power that is proper to a specific entity. Thus, this is the competence 
of a minister, but not of an undersecretary of state or a general director, 
because they only act “on behalf of” the minister, who controls their 
activity.5
Definitions are usually contained in textbooks for the introduction 
to jurisprudence, state law and administrative law. More space was de-
voted to this issue in the trilogy of Stefan Rozmaryn, Witold Zakrzewski 
and Maurycy Jaroszyński, in the context of deliberations on whether 
a minister or a ministry is an organ.6 Unfortunately, the arguments of 
Czesław Znamierowski—a legal theorist—are not based on normative 
material.7 Recently, Zygmunt Ziembiński tried to clarify this notion in 
the draft edition of Polish Legal Dictionary, but since his comments are 
in draft form they are reserved rather for internal discussion.8
1948, p. 75; C. Znamierowski, Zastępca i organ, “Ruch Prawniczy Socjologiczny i Eko-
nomiczny” 1963, 2, pp. 221–242; C. Znamierowski, Grupa społeczna i jej struktura, 
“Przegląd Socjologiczny” 1963, 1; C. Znamierowski, Działanie zbiorowe, “Ruch Prawniczy 
Socjologiczny i Ekonomiczny” 1962, 2. Z. Ziembiński in Polski Słownik Prawniczy (organ, 
state action, reguły, the constitutive rules of conventional acts); A. Łopatka, Wstęp do pra-
woznawstwa, Warszawa 1969, p. 125 ff. A person or group of persons who, in accordance 
with applicable law, undertaking actions of authority considered to be state actions. An or-
gan of state is, for example, the Sejm, the government, the minister, the court, the head of 
the presidium department; S. Ehrlich, Wstęp do nauki o państwie i prawie, Warszawa 1971, 
p. 65: by an organ of state one can understand a group (sometimes one person) that has 
been singled out to fulfill the tasks (also differentiated in detail within the group) specified 
by law. The organ is part of the whole formed by the state organization, and acts on its be-
half. Among the organs it is necessary to distinguish those which have powers of authority 
(imperium); J. Starościak, Prawo administracyjne, Warszawa 1968, p. 96. J. Wiszniewski, 
Zarys encyklopedii prawa, Warszawa 1966, p. 30. Mała Encyklopedia Prawa, Warszawa 
1959; Słownik Wiedzy Obywatelskiej, Warszawa 1970 (entry: state organs system); J. Kow-
alski, Wstęp do nauk o państwie, Warszawa 1968, p. 154. 
5 See footnote 8.
6 S. Rozmaryn, O rozszerzeniu uprawnień ministrów w PRL, “Państwo i Prawo” 1956, 
ed. 3, pp. 451–460; W. Zakrzewski, Na marginesie artykułu prof. S. Rozmaryna, “Państwo 
i Prawo” 1956, 5–6, pp. 983–993; M. Jaroszyński, Z problematyki organów państwowych, 
“Państwo i Prawo” 1956, 7, pp. 111–120; also in the collection: Z teorii i praktyki prawa 
administracyjnego w PRL, Warszawa 1964, p. 170. 
7 C. Znamierowski, op. cit.
8 Z. Ziembiński, op. cit.
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Our reflections should contribute to a broader and deeper analysis 
of the concept of an organ, and be based on numerous examples from 
practice, in order to solve a number of doubts that arise during consider-
ation of this problem, but they will not attempt to provide an exhaustive 
treatment of the subject. They sometimes refer to the views expressed, 
they tend to avoid polemics, they even try to reconcile views, and to 
some extent they go beyond what has been said in our scholarly lit-
erature. New questions raise new problems. The topic is challenging 
and controversial, especially when theoretical arguments are confronted 
with examples from practice. But can an attempt to classify an extreme-
ly rich, diverse normative reality into strict scientific categories ever be 
entirely successful?
I
An organ of state is made up of two elements: a personal substrate and 
the competence necessary to exercise power. The personal substrate 
is either a physical person or a group of people—a collegium. Legal 
provisions usually stipulate how the organ is to be staffed. However, it 
also happens that the state forms the substrate from a group that already 
exists in social reality and endows it with competence. For example: 
the examination board of a private secondary school, in other words 
a group of people existing outside the state apparatus, receives from the 
state the right to issue secondary school leaving certificates that have 
the same validity as state school leaving certificates, and thus in this 
way the group is drawn into the state apparatus, becoming a collegium 
performing the duties of a state organ. Similarly, in socialist states, the 
right to nominate candidates to be deputies (i.e. members of parliament) 
is vested in the central and local bodies of mass social organizations, so 
these organizations can perform a very important state function in the 
election process and thus potentially enter the system of organs in this 
narrow scope as well.
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It is possible to refer to an already existing social substrate; it is pos-
sible to attribute a personal element to a social organization, by means of 
which it can be granted a high level of trust. Sometimes, due to the or-
gan’s competence, it is clearly indicated that the personal element is ap-
pointed in a social way, that is, in a way that is not directly regulated by 
legal regulations. This is a familiar phenomenon in our law. On the basis 
of the decree of 10 November 1954, responsibility for the implementation 
of the Protection, Health and Safety at Work Act and the Labour Inspec-
tion Act was transferred from the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare to 
the trade unions. Their organs issue administrative acts; for example they 
adjudicate in criminal-administrative proceedings. Therefore, in the Act of 
April 14th 1967 on the Prosecutor’s Control of Compliance with the Law, 
the supervision of compliance with law also covers professional, local self-
government, cooperative and social organizations within the scope of their 
state administration functions, or other functions assigned to them by the 
Acts (Article 3 section 1, item 3). Of course, entrusting such functions to 
social organizations naturally involves them in the legal system, and thus 
valid legal provisions on the creation of organs change their character. An 
organization does not thereby cease to be social, but it does become—as far 
as these competences are concerned—an organ of state, indirectly.
Our statutes sometimes delegate certain functions generally to any 
person who may be affected. These include the following provisions:
1. Whoever in necessary defence repels a direct illegal attack with-
out indirectly harming any social or individual interest, shall not be 
deemed to have committed an offence, especially if he acts in order to 
restore public order or peace, even if this does not result from an official 
duty (Article 22 § 1 and 2 of the Polish Penal Code).
2. Everyone has the right to apprehend a person who is in the act of 
committing a crime, or who has been pursued immediately after a crime 
has been committed, and to hand him over to the Citizen’s Militia if 
there is a fear of this person hiding, or if his identity cannot be estab-
lished (Article 205 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
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3. It is the duty of every citizen to protect social property against 
imminent damage. A citizen who has suffered damage to their person 
or property while protecting social property is entitled to compensa-
tion (Article 127 of the Code of Civil Procedure). When a citizen takes 
a decision on the basis of these provisions, entering the legal sphere of 
another (this will always be the case in situations 1) and 2), he acts in the 
place of an organ of state.
When the organ is a group—a collegium—there must be, of 
course, rules that determine how a decision is made by the collegium 
as a whole, in particular what the quorum is and what majority is nec-
essary for a resolution to be made, how the chairperson of the meet-
ing is chosen. It is very important for the legal position of the group-
collegium whether it provides itself with an organizational statute, in 
other words, whether it possesses autonomy within the internal sys-
tem, or whether this statute has been established by another external 
organ. Within the framework of the supreme organs of state, the former 
position is held, to a large extent, by the Sejm and also in fact by the 
Council of State and the Council of Ministers. The latter organs adopt 
their own regulations, but they could also be given them by the Sejm.
The next issue to address is the element of organisational separation 
emphasized in the definitions, since there are different levels on which 
this separation can be distinguished. The problem does not raise any 
doubts in the cases of the Sejm, the Council of State or the Council of 
Ministers, because these collegia obviously constitute an “organization-
al unity” in themselves. Nevertheless, the distinction of smaller groups 
within them—such as committees—creates new “organizational units”. 
This is a complicated matter when it comes to the Supreme Control 
Chamber, ministries and courts …
With the Supreme Court, is the issue the organisational division of 
the Supreme Court is in relation to other organs and other courts? Or is it 
rather the special chambers of the Supreme Court, or maybe departments 
within chambers, or finally, about the distinction within them of judi-
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cial panels with different numbers of members, or maybe the Supreme 
Court in full, in the form of a General Assembly? Is the full Supreme Court 
the organ, or are the individual chambers, or the judging panels within 
them also organs? Is the organ the First President himself or is it the 
administrative collegium?
Here we must return to the starting point of our deliberations. The 
organ is a person or a group of persons; a group treated as a collegi-
um that works together. Thus, it cannot simply be the Supreme Court 
that is the organ, even as a General Assembly, but only the individual 
judges, including the First President, the presidents and the administra-
tive collegium, as well as the disciplinary court, the high and highest 
disciplinary court. The organ is distinguished by the rules of appointing 
and dismissing the person who holds the function of an organ, and in our 
case the rules on the appointment of individual judges.
The second important distinguishing feature is the competence con-
ferred on a person or collegium, which is generally established on a per-
manent basis, i.e. for an indefinite period of time, either by a statute or by 
further provisions adopted on its basis. Competence could also be estab-
lished, at least in theory, on a case by case basis. Such would be an ad hoc 
organ established for a specific case, with an appointed panel of judges. The 
separation of an organ is, in a way, born of  itself—once by establishing this 
group, and secondly by assigning it, for example, its specific competence.
In our example of the Supreme Court, in addition to the commonly 
known sources that relate to the organization and competence of this 
Court, special attention should be paid to the regulations contained in 
the resolution of the State Council of 22 May 1962. Organizational 
and competence provisions are closely intertwined therein. The ordi-
nance of the First President issued in agreement with the Minister of 
Justice specifies the division of the Chambers into departments. When 
the First President appoints the Presidents of the chambers in the de-
partments (§§ 8 and 4), these are organizational elements, but when 
the administrative collegium allocates judges to the chambers and de-
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partments for the division of activities, these are organizational and 
competence elements.
Both the personal substrate and competence are essential elements 
for the existence of an organ. However, there is a difference between 
them. While for the personal element it can be sufficient to identify 
an existing social group or body, competence must be regulated expres-
sis verbis. When competence is granted to the personal substrate, this 
creates an organ. In this sense, there is a multitude of organs within the 
Supreme Court. Each specific panel that is judging, setting guidelines or 
answering a legal question is an organ.
Such a multitude of organs existing within organizational units or 
within the machinery of smaller units is a very common phenomenon. 
In the ministry, alongside the minister, the governing organ, there are 
undersecretaries of state, directors general and directors of departments. 
In our opinion, they are organs, because a certain personal substrate has 
a specific competence based on the organisational statute of the ministry 
adopted by the Council of Ministers. It has been said that undersecre-
taries, directors general, etc. are not organs because the concept of an 
organ of state implies it has its own competence. However, an entity 
whose scope of activity can be interfered with at will lacks its “own” 
competence.9
9 M. Jaroszyński, Polskie Prawo Administracyjne, Warszawa 1956, p. 16.  For example, the 
minister has the scope of competence specified by law and therefore constitutes a state organ. 
However, the undersecretary of state (deputy minister) or any other employee of the ministry 
is not a separate state organ in the strict sense of the word,  because they do not exercise their 
competence as determined by legal regulations, but the competence of the minister as a state 
organ. For this reason, it is not a state organ in the strict sense of the ministry as a whole,  and 
neither are the internal elements of the ministry, like departments… J. Starościak, Prawo ad-
ministracyjne, Warszawa 1969, pp. 51, 52, 54: How to explain the fact that some employees 
of the ministry, such as department director, are able to make independent decisions? The fact 
that the director makes a decision, even if he is authorized to do so by the ministry’s regula-
tions, does not make him a separate administrative organ. He is the person who performs the 
office, who does not have his own competences, performs part of the competences of the min-
ister, and the minister can withhold any part of these competences, can reserve any decision to 
himself; thus each ministry clerk conducts these matters not on his own behalf, but on behalf 
of the minister and within the competence of the minister.
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If this view were adopted, there would be only one organ in an ab-
solute state—an absolute monarch—who could assume the competence 
of the organs he created. Almost all the activities of the Vice Presi-
dent of the United States of America or of the Secretary (head of the 
department) would not be an expression of the competence of the or-
gans of that name. The diplomatic representatives of the state abroad 
must follow the precise instructions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
who may at any time rescind their competence by sending a separate 
representative tasked with dealing with a specific matter. The General 
Prosecutor may undertake any action that falls within the scope of the 
prosecutor’s office or have the action prosecuted by subordinate pros-
ecutors, unless the law reserves a particular activity exclusively to his 
jurisdiction. The Council of Ministers may take over the competence of 
the Presidium of the Government or the commission for matters of the 
presidia of national councils.
There is no doubt that the composition of the Supreme Court has its 
own competence, in the sense that no one is permitted to interfere with 
it, and that the undersecretary of state or the director of the department 
does not have his “own” competence. However, he has the competence 
specified in the statutes of the ministry. This is a necessary and sufficient 
element. Within the organizational units called the “Supreme Court” and 
the “ministry” there are quite different inter-organizational systems.
II
Are organs only those persons or groups to whom the statute is to be 
issued in its final form, or is the specific participation provided for 
by law in the establishment thereof sufficient? Do  the Sejm and Sen-
ate from the March Constitution form an organ together, or do the 
Sejm and Senate form separate organs? It seems that when passing 
laws, the organ is every chamber of parliament, the group of people 
to whom legislative initiative belongs; and that it is also an organ that 
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signs the law stating its adoption and the body which orders its prom-
ulgation, if the promulgation is a condition for its validity. In all these 
cases—in accordance with our assumptions—a specific group of per-
sons has a specific competence.
Therefore, a doubt must be clarified. It was said that since the com-
petence to propose a candidate for deputy or to submit a draft law (to im-
plement a legislative initiative) qualifies the entity thus endowed as an 
organ, a citizen bringing an action should also be consistently recog-
nised as an organ, because in this case he or she forces the court to act. 
As is well known, Kelsen went even further in his deliberations, to sug-
gest that a citizen concluding an agreement is an organ. Our position 
is as follows: a group of citizens who propose a candidate or who take 
a legislative initiative in accordance with legal procedure act within 
the framework of the state apparatus, thereby act as a subject of a state 
authority with partial competence, and exercise their political rights. On 
the other hand, a citizen bringing an action turns to the state apparatus 
not as a subject of authority that has a political right, i.e. the right to 
co-determine the state, but as a beneficiary exercising his social right, 
which means that he can demand assistance from the state in the form 
of a service. In the first case, the citizen ad statum reipublicae spectat, 
while in the second ad singuli utilitatem. In the first case he is a member 
of a control organ, but is not an organ in the second. 
Competence which consists of the functions of only one stage in the 
process of creating an act sometimes arises through the appointment of 
a person who holds the function of an organ, and sometimes by election 
or nomination. Of these acts, the election to the Sejm is obviously the 
most important. It consists of two sets of state actions—proposing can-
didates and their election, from which it follows that, under the electoral 
rules, certain persons were elected as deputies. The nomination of can-
didates for deputies by the District Committee of the Front of National 
Unity is an act of a social organisation acting as an organ of state in 
this respect. All citizens registered in the electoral councils in a given 
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district operate as a fully-fledged organ. It is this that decides, according 
to a certain procedure, which of the proposed candidates is to become 
a deputy. The District Committee must be treated as separate organ, as 
must the collegium of voters, although the actions of these two groups 
constitute one decision.
In a similar sense, the appointment of Supreme Court judges by the 
Council of State is usually the result of two organs—the ministry of jus-
tice, which proposes a set of candidates for judges of the Supreme Court, 
and the selection made by the Council of State. The case is slightly dif-
ferent when the Council of State has its own candidates, from among the 
judges of either the past or new term. In this case the Minister of Justice 
issues an opinion on them, which should be considered by the Council 
of State. There is no significant difference from the previously discussed 
act of the election of deputies. While for technical reasons the collegium 
of voters can only  elect deputies from the group of registered candidates 
previously submitted by the district electoral commission, the Council 
of State may also elect judges from outside the group of persons submit-
ted. Omission of the stage provided for in this case, that is, the Minister 
of Justice issuing an opinion, would not result in the invalidity of the 
nominations. Thus, the act of proposing candidates in the election pro-
cedure is more important than the act of presenting the candidates for 
judges by the Minister of Justice, since this stage could be omitted with-
out prejudice to the validity of the final act.
The process of appointing the person who holds the function of an 
organ can be shaped in other ways: the candidate selected by the organ 
should be approved by a second organ. The issue here is the two acts 
of organs of state. Thus the Act on National Councils stipulates that the 
chairman of the presidium elected by the voivodship national council 
must be approved by the Council of Ministers. The validity of the act 
of appointment depends on two unanimous decisions of the two organs.
This question is difficult to resolve: what is the significance of an 
opinion, provided for by law, being issued in the course of a legal act? 
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A distinction must be made here between the following cases: either the 
opinion is issued by a committee selected by a collegiate organ or by 
a single individual or group that stands outside the organ, or the opinion 
is an independent act in itself, as in the case of a referendum.
It seems to us that the mere issuing of an opinion, even if prescribed 
by law, does not itself qualify the person or group that issues it as an or-
gan of state. Moreover, legal regulations should stipulate that as a result 
of an opinion a given individual or group puts forward specific motions 
that must become the subject of formal deliberations, e.g. a parliamenta-
ry committee submits certain amendments to a bill that the Sejm must 
discuss and adopt a specific stance on.
This raises the question of how to classify the agreement from the 
decision-making organ of the Central Council of Trade Unions that is 
sometimes required when issuing legal acts. The Act on the establish-
ment of the Labor and Wages Committee of 13 April 1960 states that the 
scope and mode of operation of ZUS (the Social Insurance Institution) 
will be determined by the Council of Ministers in agreement with the 
Central Council of Trade Unions. On this basis, the Council of Ministers 
issued the ordinance of 27 April 1960 (Journal of Laws of the Republic of 
Poland, item 134) as its own act, stating at the outset that it was issued in 
agreement with the Central Council of Trade Unions. How to assess the 
role of the Council here? Did it have to give its full consent as a condi-
tion for the act to be valid? Or was it only a matter of issuing an opinion, 
which the Council of Ministers was obliged to take into account as far 
as possible? Of course, the Central Council is not the legal co-creator of 
the regulation. If this is how statutory authorization were to be under-
stood, it would constitute a breach of the Sejm’s competence, since the 
Sejm cannot authorize a social organ to issue or even co-issue such an act. 
In its authorization, the Sejm only obliged the government to take maxi-
mum account of the demands of the Central Council. Therefore, the par-
ticipation of the Central Council of Trade Unions must be qualified as 
issuing an opinion. Does such participation in issuing the act draw the 
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Central Council into the circle of state organs? Our answer is negative. 
Such an effect could only result from the power to issue normative acts. 
Finally, the issue of the organ in a referendum should be clarified. 
In a capitalist state, it would be appropriate for all those who express an 
opinion to not qualify a particular body as an organ, because the prin-
ciple of a free mandate applies there, as a result of which the opinion 
expressed in the popular vote is only an expression of a state-ordered 
investigation of social moods that can bind parliament politically, but 
not legally. However, this is not the case in a socialist state: the result of 
a referendum is binding on the people’s representatives, so all citizens 
should be considered as an organ. On the basis of the Act of 27 April 
1946 on People’s Voting, such an authority once existed in Poland, be-
cause at that time—in the times of the National Council—the rule of 
a deputy’s binding mandate was in force.
However, an organ of state is not constituted by a meeting of the 
electorate before which a deputy reports on his or her activities and 
which makes demands of him or her, because there is no specific reso-
lution expressing confidence in a deputy or demanding a certain action 
from him or her. This would be an organ of the electorate, which decides 
on the dismissal of a deputy or councilor. As it is well known, only 
the dismissal of a councilor was regulated in the electoral ordinance of 
October 31, 1957, which entails that the deputy’s dismissal is no lon-
ger valid, due to the lack of implementing provisions in relation to the 
Constitution.
It turns out that the multiplicity of organs of state is caused not only by 
the fact that the competence to issue acts is diffused in such a way that the 
organs only have a small scope in this area, but also by the fact that the de-
cision-making process is divided between different organs.
Just as in the Supreme Court there are many organs—as we have 
seen, and just as in a ministry there are a significant number of organs, 
in another inter-organizational system, we can also identify many or-
gans in the entities that go by the name of  faculty chairs. Here in the 
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university there are numerous examination boards for the admission of 
candidates for studies (the admission of students is of course an admin-
istrative act) or a Master’s examination (awarding diplomas is another 
such act). The Faculty Council awards the degree of Doctor or habilitat-
ed Doctor, the senate makes the decision of the university—the faculty 
council and the senate are organs of public authority, while also being 
the organs of a legal person. In the departments of the state health ser-
vice, a doctor has the right to issue administrative documents confirm-
ing the inability of patients to work, which automatically results in the 
person being excepted from the obligation to work.
III
Of course, order needs to be brought to this multitude of organs, and we 
have a remedy for this purpose in the legal system.
It is well known that the act of individuals or group-collegia is attrib-
uted to the state, and thanks to this attribution the unit or group constitutes 
a state organ. In a collegium, this is a very complicated matter. First, there 
must be rules that must be followed in order for the acts of individuals 
forming the group to be considered the acts of the group itself. The ques-
tion here is what the quorum is to be, and what majority—ordinary abso-
lute or qualified—is to be adopted by the collegium as a whole; secondly, 
this conventional act is attributed to the state. The collegium adopts the 
resolution—the state issues the legal act. 
In addition to this attribution, which—as we have seen—in the case 
of the collegiate body is double in the above conception, there may be 
a third attribution, which in the case of the collegiate body falls between 
the first and second. The verdict of the Supreme Court panel ruling be-
gins—as we know—with the words: “the Supreme Court consisting 
of …”. In other words, the ruling which the majority of the members of 
the panel arrived at is uttered first of all by virtue of the legal rules as-
signed to the entire panel, in other words the judging collegium, is at 
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the same time is attributed to the Supreme Court as an organizational 
unit, which is expressed in the saying: “the Supreme Court consist-
ing of …, at the same time”—and this is a further attribution—“of the 
state”. Thus, the judging panel issues a judgment, the Supreme Court 
issues a judgment, the State issues a judgment.10 
The case of a minister and his undersecretary of state etc. is similar 
(with a different inter-organizational arrangement, of course). Since it 
is a one-man organ of public authority, one degree of attribution is not 
necessary. The activities of the department director are by law assigned 
to the minister and the state.
The same goes for the multiplicity of organs in university chairs. 
The act of the Master’s examination committee is attributed to the uni-
versity—this is expressed, not very precisely, in the words: X obtained 
a Master’s diploma at the university, which places the emphasis not so 
much on the constitutive decision of the organ as on the element of the 
candidate’s own work. The act of awarding a doctoral degree is attrib-
uted to the Faculty Council acting on behalf of “the university”. In this 
way the number of organs is reduced to one organisational unit. The ad-
ministrative act of a doctor should be attributed to the health care insti-
tution for whom the doctor works. In the case of teaching or health care 
institutions, the attribution is not as verbally precise as in the case of 
court rulings.
It seems that on this basis one can say that the word “organ” has 
two meanings. When we say that the Sejm meets during a plenary ses-
sion, we mean an organ in the first sense; when we say that a minister 
has issued a decision that was in fact taken by the director of the de-
partment and attributed to the minister, it is an organ the second sense; 
when the Supreme Court issues a judgment, it is an organ in the second 
10 This is not a new concept: A. Merkl, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, Wien–Berlin 1927, 
p. 305: With these individual bodies, the functions of the state are assigned to the state 
through a collective organs built into the state as a transition point, they are somewhat in-
directly state organs. Our remark: the author distinguishes between collective and collegial 
bodies; the collective body is the ministry.
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sense, because, after all, the verdict was issued by one of many of its 
judges.
Such attribution brings welcome order to our considerations, but it 
does not solve all the difficulties. It is impossible to attribute all the acts 
issued by the Supreme Court to this Court as an organ in the second 
sense, nor all acts in a ministry to the minister. The First President does 
not act “on behalf of” the Supreme Court, which thereby decides to 
submit a motion on the interpretation of the provision and thus sets in 
motion the composition of the court, the chamber, the general assem-
bly. Neither does this apply to an administrative collegium or higher 
or supreme disciplinary court. These organs do not act on behalf of the 
Supreme Court, but in their own name as organs with predominantly in-
ternal functions. It would be contrary to reality to attribute the resolution 
of the ministerial collegium to the minister.
Therefore, one more meaning of an organ must be created: an organ 
as a group of organizationally closely-linked organs: those to which the 
construction “on behalf of” can be applied, as well as others (internal). 
In the last sense, the ministry is obviously an organ. Thus we come to 
the solution employed by Professor Rozmaryn in his 1956 article O ro-
zszerzeniu uprawnień ministrów w PRL (On Extending the Powers of 
Ministers in the People’s Republic of Poland). A minister is an organ 
of state in the first sense when he acts alone, in the second sense when 
a department director acts on his behalf, this director being in the same 
sense an organ as the judging panel of the Supreme Court, although in 
a quite different inter-organizational system.
The legal sciences are usually of the view that a minister is an organ 
of public authority, because he is attributed the decisions issued by the 
ministry’s employees (on behalf of the minister). Legislation very stub-
bornly uses term “ministry” (Article 32 of the Constitution: “The Coun-
cil of Ministers shall coordinate the activities of ministries and other 
subordinate bodies. …”); uses “central office”, also the “central admin-
istrative body” as a synonym for the central office (not in the sense of: 
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head of office); and uses the terms “department” (not head of depart-
ment - see the Act on National Councils), “customs office”, etc. The 
legal sciences use the term “organ” in the first and second sense, while 
the legislation uses it in the third sense.
Within our framework, it is not easy to classify organs that are com-
bined together. And so the Labour and Wages Committee established by 
the Act of 13 April 1960 (JL RP, item 119) consists of the chairman ap-
pointed by the Sejm (Council of State),  deputy chairmen appointed by 
the president of the council of ministers, two representatives of planning 
committees and the Minister of Finance, the president of ZUS (the Social 
Security Board) and five representatives of the presidium of the Central 
Council of Trade Unions appointed and dismissed by them. The Commit-
tee operates in three forms: the chairman, the presidium composed of the 
chairman, deputies and members appointed by the Council of Ministers 
(Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 23 June 1960—Monitor Polski 
item 259), and the plenary session. The distribution of competence be-
tween these three bodies is as yet not known, as the statutes of the Com-
mittee adopted by the Council of Ministers have not been announced. 
There is the clear competence of the Chairman, who not only chairs the 
Plenary and Presidium (and probably coordinates the work of these bod-
ies), but first and foremost sits on the Council of Ministers and represents 
the Committee there, and also has the right to issue orders and regulations 
on matters falling within the scope of the Committee’s activities in cases 
specified by law. In this respect, he is equated with ministers. It is not the 
Committee, but he that issues executive regulations to the Acts, and it is 
likely that the internal regulations specify what influence the presidium or 
the Committee has on their content. The latter, defined in the Act as a col-
legiate organ, is an organ in the first sense when it acts in its full form (at 
least with the quorum), in the second when the presidium or the Chairman 
acts on its behalf (e.g. at a meeting of the Council of Ministers), and in 
the third when it concerns a set of organs regulated in the organisational 
statutes of the unit called the Committee.
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IV
Collegiate organs must, by their very nature, have internal organs, at 
least in the form of a chairman. Such an internal structure is already pro-
vided for by the three-person judging panels. Larger organs have a more 
complex internal organization, and in particular they include further 
smaller groups, such as committees, among their members. The chair-
man has two functions: he represents the organ externally, and also acts 
behind the collegium in certain internal cases, e.g. in urgent ones, like 
chairman of the presidium of the national council, subject of course to 
the approval of the plenary, but in principle his competence, like that 
of other internal bodies, is directed inwards. Commissions prepare the 
decisions and in particular deliver opinions to the plenary.
In the Sejm, a presidium operates as a representative organ, and as 
such for the internal organization of its work (it seems, however, that the 
Marshal as the chairman of the meeting is a separate organ, a fact which 
is omitted in the regulations), while the organs preparing decisions 
and issuing opinions are the Sejm committees. What happens when the 
group selected by the collegium has the power to issue acts outside? 
This can either be clearly seen by the organizational structure of the 
state, an example being the Council of State in relation to the Sejm, and 
then of course a new organ exists, or the collegium confers upon the 
committee it selects the right to act independently, being empowered 
to do so by law. Then this committee, although it draws its competence 
from the authority of the collegium, ceases to be an internal organ, in 
terms of self-empowerment. When the parliamentary committees issue 
desiderata to the supreme state organs, they act as an independent organ, 
since the desiderata are not subject to the approval of the plenum, neither 
before nor after they are forwarded to the addressee, and furthermore, 
the representatives of the committee do not submit at any plenary meet-
ing reports on its activities in this field. In this way, the committees have 
become autonomous and external organs at some point in their work, 
operating externally. This role should be reflected in the Constitution it-
76 | Karol Marian Pospieszalski
self. The committees of the Council of State are exclusively internal or-
gans of public authority, since the Council of State always acts outside.
The so-called internal organs of the Council of Ministers are also 
independent organs, which are usually established by its resolution, but 
are not always composed only of its members. Only the National De-
fence Committee has a statutory basis. The Resolution of the Council 
of Ministers of 30 June 1969 on the procedures for the operation of 
the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Government does 
not even provide for the Council of Ministers to confirm the resolu-
tions of the Presidium, nor does it provide for the Presidium to report 
on its activities to the plenary session. The Council of Ministers may, of 
course, take over the competence of the Presidium, but will only do so 
in practice if the Presidium itself takes the initiative.
The question arises of whether the Council of Ministers is allowed 
to establish such organs and entrust them with some of its competenc-
es. Our answer is affirmative. The executive and managing organ must 
be resilient. It seems that the power to create such organs is implicitly 
contained in the general executive and managing competence of the 
Council of Ministers. The competence also stems from life’s necessity. 
It would, of course, be advisable for such power to be granted to the 
government expressis verbis.
V
The authors of the definition of an organ of state repeatedly assert that 
such an organ acts on behalf of the state. There is no doubt that the act of 
a person or collegium constituting an organ is imputable to the state and 
as such is a state act. However, in our view, this does not always mean 
that it can be said that the organ acts on behalf of the state. The legal acts 
of organs can be divided into two groups: some are legal acts that have 
an effect within the state apparatus in the continuous process of con-
crete shaping of the legal system and the system of state organs; at other 
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times they are acts issued by state organs in relation to natural and legal 
persons standing outside the state apparatus, addressed to the citizen as 
a subject or a ward. An example of the first group is the election of depu-
ties in a multi-mandate constituency by a collegium of those with politi-
cal rights, or the self-organization of the Sejm  in the form of the election 
of the Presidium of the Sejm, etc. An example for the second group is 
the issuing of judgments and administrative acts to citizens in the form 
of granting certain powers or imposing obligations. Here the organ ad-
dresses the citizen on behalf of the state as a whole, as an empowered 
entity in relation to a person who in this case is not empowered. It seems 
that only in this (second) category of acts can the expression “on behalf 
of” be used, in line with the accepted meaning of the word.
The situation is somewhat different (but at the same time there are 
some similarities) in the case of acts of state organs under civil law—the 
conclusion of agreements between the state and the citizen, i.e. between 
two formally equal entities, in legal terms. The same applies mutatis 
mutandis to relations in the field of international law, where one entity 
acts in relation to another. And here we can say that an organ acts “on 
behalf of” the state.
Finally, this term is used for cases where the operation of an organ is 
attributed to one of many bodies in a complex organisational unit. It can 
probably be reasonably said that the panel of the Supreme Court acts 
on behalf of the Supreme Court. From these considerations it follows that 
the concept of attribution is broader than the concept of  “on behalf of”. 
One should consider whether it would be advisable to abolish this term 
taken from civil law (currently it is used by Article 734 of the Civil Code), 
as its meaning in state law is after all different.
In our law, the term “on behalf of” has been aptly used twice: once 
in Article 47 of the Constitution—the courts issue judgments on behalf 
of the Polish People’s Republic (this is repeated by the relevant ordinary 
statutes), and, second, in the acts of ratification of the Council of State, 
which, on behalf of the Polish People’s Republic, makes it known to 
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the public that such and such an international convention has been con-
cluded and that the Polish People’s Republic undertakes to apply it after 
its enactment. The term “on behalf of” refers, in essence, to this very 
obligation.
VI
Finally, the last thing to be addressed in these considerations is the names 
for groups of organs or the organs themselves in our law. Thus we have the 
organs of public authority, state administrative bodies, and among them the 
chief executive and managing bodies; with regard to the Supreme Control 
Chamber (NIK), and the courts (the Constitution uses the name “Court” 
in the title of Chapter VI, in the singular form), the term “organ” has not 
been used in our Basic Law. The title of Chapter VI our Constitution men-
tions the prosecutor’s office and not prosecutors, yet in the final provision 
about the prosecutor’s office it mentions the organs of the prosecution. 
Does this mean that the Constitution treats the Court and the prosecutor’s 
office as organs, but not courts and prosecutors? Of course, this conclusion 
cannot be drawn from such formulations. The name “prosecutor’s office” 
is equivalent to “administration”. Therefore, the term “prosecuting body” 
ought to have been used in the title, since the name “administrative bod-
ies” was used, as was, similarly, “judicial bodies”. The Supreme Court Act 
states that the Supreme Court is the supreme judicial body, the Act on the 
prosecutor’s office that the Public Prosecutor-General is the supreme body 
of the prosecutor’s office according to the title of the act itself, and the term 
“prosecuting bodies” is already used in the Constitution. The term “organ” 
of the Supreme Control Chamber (NIK) is not used  in the Act on State 
Audit Office, or in the Sejm’s resolution on the relations between NIK and 
the Sejm, nor does the term “organ” appear in the law on common courts 
(Articles 1 §2, 40 §2, 93, 125 §1 do not apply to courts). This is the best 
proof that it is possible to write laws without using this word, which often 
helps the editor of normative texts steer clear of trouble.
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In our Constitution there is no general term that is used for all the 
organs of public authority at the highest level, i.e. the Sejm, the Council 
of State, the Supreme Control Chamber, the Council of Ministers, and 
for the ministers and committees that perform the functions of supreme 
administrative bodies, the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General. One 
could use the words “supreme organs of public authority” or “supreme 
administrative bodies” when referring to supreme supervisory bodies, 
the judiciary, prosecutors in general, and even more generally all to-
gether as “supreme organs of state”. However, a certain obstacle to the 
use of such terminology is the fact that the legislator said of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences that it performs the function of a supreme organ of 
state, and the fact that we cannot include the constitutional organs listed 
above in the same plane as the Polish Academy of Sciences, where the 
name “supreme organs of state” is undoubtedly the best.
What does the term “organs of public authority” mean? Are they not 
all organs, because they perform the functions of authority? They are, of 
course, organs of authority in the usual sense. If the Constitution, follow-
ing the Act of 20 March 1950 on local organs of the unified state author-
ity, applied this name to the Sejm, the Council of State (not very consis-
tently), and national councils, it is because the elected bodies should also 
be terminologically elevated above others, as the being at the head of 
the entire state organization. The Council of State was given this name 
rather because it is an emanation of the Sejm and may replace the Sejm 
in certain spheres, but the use of this name is not as justified as it is with 
the Sejm and councils. The term “organs of public authority” is appro-
priate for the “organs of the nation” of a capitalist state. In the March 
Constitution, the “organs of the nation” were the Sejm and Senate, the 
President of the Republic, ministers and independent courts. The name 
“organs of the nation” can still be found in the first acts of the Legislative 
Sejm of People’s Republic of: the Sejm is “the supreme organ of the na-
tion”, but this no longer applies to the  President, Council of State, the 
government and Courts.
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Some doubts may be raised by the name “the chief executive and 
governing organ of public authority” when it is used to refer to the 
Council of Ministers. At the level of national councils, the appropri-
ate organ, i.e. the presidium, is defined differently: it is the organ of the 
national council (Article 42 sec. 1 of the Constitution). If we apply this 
structure consistently, it should be said that the Council of Ministers 
is the executive and governing organ of the Sejm and the Council of 
State, or better still, the executive and governing organ of the organs 
of public authority. This stylistic clumsiness probably led to the name 
being simplified and distorted.
What is the situation in other socialist constitutions? The model of 
the Soviet Union is followed by the constitutions of Bulgaria (1947) and 
Czechoslovakia (1960); while the constitution of Yugoslavia (1963) is 
within the framework of the construction of  “organ of the organ”, thus 
the Federal Executive Council is the organ of the Socialist Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia; while, rather differently, in the constitution of Albania 
the government was called the chief executive and governing organ of the 
Albanian People’s Republic; and then in the constitutions of Romania 
(1965) and Hungary (1949), the Council of Ministers is the supreme ad-
ministrative organ, the term which was used and in our Constitution in the 
title of Chapter 4.
Is the issue really the organ of the organ—organ of the Sejm or the 
national council? The Sejm and the Council of Ministers, the national 
council and the presidium (the latter, despite being regulated in a single 
law) are organs in a separate division, the national council in the divi-
sion of organs of public authority, the presidium in the division of ad-
ministrative bodies. There is no indication that an act of the Council of 
Ministers is to be attributed to the Sejm, and the act of the presidium to 
the national council. The term “executive and governing organ of the 
council” is simply a name that expresses very political and legal content. 
The executive and governing bodies are to maintain a close relationship 
with the organs of public authority, and through them with the work-
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ing people. We also encounter the construction “organ of the organ” in 
the Sejm’s regulations—the organs of the Sejm. Despite this name, it 
is a completely different issue here—namely the internal bodies whose 
acts are not attributed to the collegiate organ within which they exist.
In the past, the name “organs” was often used instead of the term 
“authorities”. This name was still employed (this is probably at the end 
of its career) in in the Act on the Organizational Changes of Supreme 
Authorities of the National Economy of February 10, 1949. The Act of 
March 20, 1950 refers for the first time to “local organs of uniform public 
authorities” so not “authority” as “organ”, but as “public authority”. The 
use of the term “authorities” to denote “organs” will be gradually and 
completely removed from the Polish lexicon. Clear proof of this is the 
terminological change which was reflected in the amendment of the law 
on the Common Court System of 19 December 1963. In Article 1 § 2 of 
this law, which reads  “the common courts do not administer justice in 
matters transferred by special laws to other courts or authorities”, the 
word “authorities” was replaced by the word “organs”.  However, “au-
thorities” remains in Articles 93 and 125.
VII
The name “organ of state” is ambiguous. We use it in the following 
meanings: it means a person or collegium endowed with a certain com-
petence; it also means a person (e.g. a minister) or an organizational 
entity (e.g. the Supreme Court) to whom the acts of a certain group of 
organs are attributed; and lastly, it means a set of organs connected to 
each other in terms of organization and competence, a set that includes 
both organs operating in the name of a person or entity in the sense men-
tioned above, as well as all other (internal) organs. In the last sense, we 
can also speak of the Sejm as an organ, when we mean not only the Sejm 
during a plenary session, but also the group of organs in the Sejm exist-
ing together with the Sejm during a plenary session. Lastly, it can be 
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said that an organ is a part of the state apparatus composed of very dif-
ferent systems of many organs. The second and third meanings derive 
from the first meaning. One has to start from the fact that an organ is 
a person or a collegium …
In addition, the name is used inaccurately in other meanings.11 The 
name “organ” is very useful, and we resort to it when a better term does 
not come to our mind.12
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Jaroszyński M., Z problematyki organów państwowych, “Państwo i Pra-
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session of state law institutions in Ustroń near Kępno. The author supplemented his work 
with considerations on the third meaning of the word “organ”, to some extent referring to 
the statements of A. Mycielski.
On the Concept of an… | 83 
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